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Introduction
For nearly 20 years, Norway has contributed financially to 
less-wealthy EU countries. From €120 million (1994–1998), 
these contributions have reached nearly €1.8 billion for 
the period 2009–2014. In the first period of contributions 
through the Financial Mechanism,1 there were five recipi-
ent states. Today, Norway contributes, together with Iceland 
and Liechtenstein, to 15 – a majority of the EU members.2  
The Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has said that these 
contributions represent excellent ‘propaganda’ for Norway in 
Europe.3 Indeed, there are reasons to believe that Norway’s 
contribution to the 15 poorest EU states is important for how 
they, and the EU, perceive Norway. But what exactly does Nor-
way get in return? Should the Grants be understood simply 
as an act of solidarity? Or do the financial contributions serve 
as a source of soft power, providing increased influence in 
the EU?
The objective of this policy brief is not to assess whether the 
Grants have helped to reduce economic and social dispari-
ties, nor to explain why the Grants emerged. We focus on 
how and to what extent Norway has had and can have politi-
cal advantage from these contributions, in relations with the 
EU and the beneficiary states. This brief can serve as a case-
study examining the relation between a policy (the Grants) 
and soft power. 
The term ‘soft power’ was developed by Joseph Nye in his 
Bound to Lead (1990). In 2004, Nye elaborated on the con-
cept in his Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, 
1 All Financial Mechanisms are here referred to as ‘Grants’ un-
less otherwise specified. 
2 In 1994, the beneficiary states were Greece, Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Current beneficiary states are 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain.
3 ‘TV2 News’, 10 June 2011.
using the concept to underscore the fact that states can 
no longer rely exclusively on carrots and sticks in order 
to achieve their foreign policy goals. As shown in a recent 
NUPI working paper, the concept of soft power has been ap-
plied to a diverse set of countries and entities, with the USA 
and the EU being the most prominent examples (Johnsen 
and Rieker 2013).
It is almost a cliché that Norway ‘punches above its weight’ 
on the global stage. According to Nye (2004: 112), Norway 
‘has developed a voice and presence out of proportion to 
its modest size and resources’. Norway has made some ef-
forts towards understanding, measuring and mastering soft 
power. For instance, in 2004 the government established 
a group to work on improving the country’s image. It also 
commissioned a report from Leonard and Small (2003) on 
the country’s soft power. Leonard and Small (2003: 1) argue 
that public diplomacy for Norway involves overcoming the 
country’s ‘invisibility’. It is also about increasing awareness 
within the EU and its member states of the EEA agreement, 
to which Norway is a party. In other words, soft power can 
be a means for obtaining awareness and access. 
The development of the Grants 
With the signing of the EEA agreement in 1992, a finan-
cial mechanism was established so that the EFTA/EEA 
states could contribute to the less-prosperous states of 
the EEA/EU. While Norwegian negotiators at the time 
saw this as a temporary arrangement (Johnsen 1998), 
there have been negotiations on the size of the Grants 
five times since 1992. 
Since 1994, their size has increased almost 1500 per cent 
from around €120 million to €1788.5 million. Today the 
Grants cover 15 member states. Negotiations for 2014–2019 
are expected to be conducted by the end of 2013. 
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Graph 1. Size of financial arrangements (in million EUR)
From financial aid to foreign policy instrument
Political awareness about the possibilities of using the 
Grants as a source of power has developed gradually in 
Norway. The Grants were generally overlooked until the 
‘big bang’ enlargement of the EU, and subsequently the 
EEA, in 2004. For instance, the final evaluation report for 
the Grants 1999–2003 has never been finalized. Now per-
ceptions seem to have shifted: from being a marginal sym-
bolic element of EU cooperation in 1994, the Grants have 
emerged as an important element of Norway’s policy and 
relations to the EU (NMFA 2012). 
Politicians’ approach has also shifted from hesitation to 
greater acceptance. In fact, Norway had challenged the very 
continuation of the Grants at the end of the first period in 
1998. The three Nordic EU members plus Germany and the 
UK initially supported the Norwegian position (Bjellaanes 
1998), but Spain’s EU ambassador, Javier Elorza Cavengt, 
declared that Spain would cancel the EEA agreement if the 
principle of the permanence of the financial arrangement 
was not accepted (Otterdal 1998). These negative reactions 
from Spain and the risk of damaging Norway’s relations 
to the EU soon made doubts about the continuation of the 
Grants a non-issue in Norway (Johnsen 2010: 35–36). 
While the 1999–2003 Grants were the same size as in the 
preceding period, in 2004 the Norwegian government faced 
unexpectedly high demands. Norwegian negotiators proved 
hesitant, but still ended up moving far beyond their own 
starting point. The final result entailed that the EFTA/EEA 
countries would contribute Grants worth nearly €1167 mil-
lion from 2004 to 2009, an increase of almost 1000 per 
cent from the previous period. In justifying the increase, the 
government used the solidarity argument, citing Norway’s 
responsibility to help cover the costs of the 2004 ‘big bang’ 
EU eastwards enlargement.
From being understood by Norwegian politicians as prima-
rily an act of solidarity and moral responsibility, the Grants 
have increasingly been seen as a foreign policy instrument. 
This was first officially expressed by the Norwegian parlia-
mentary committee in relation to its treatment of Proposi-
tion 3 on the Grants for 2004–2009 (NMFA 2003), when 
the Committee argued that the Grants could present op-
portunities for Norwegian businesses, research institutions 
and other organizations (Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence 2004). The next financial arrangement, 
the Norway Grants for Bulgaria and Romania, set bilateral 
partnership as a precondition for funding of projects. 
Recently, the Norwe-
gian government has 
expressed the ‘soft-
power ambition’ of 
using the Grants to 
strengthen the coun-
try’s ‘general reputa-
tion in the benefici-
ary states’ (NMFA 
2010: 3). The foreign 
minister at the time, 
Jonas G. Støre, called 
the 2009–2014 
Grants an ‘historic 
opportunity’ for Nor-
way, adding that the 
greatest challenge 
would be to ‘draw 
out political capital 
on the investment’ 
from the Grants 
(Støre 2009a).
The Grants – a source of soft power?
The Grants represent a major contribution from Norway to 
large parts of Europe, promoting a peaceful and prosperous 
continent which is clearly in Norway’s interest. In addition, 
the Grants have the potential to strengthen Norway’s access 
and ‘policy-shaping’ capabilities through a set of soft-power 
resources that, if used wisely, may increase the likelihood 
of Norwegian soft power in the EU and its member states. 
First, the Grants can contribute to perceptions of Norway 
as a stable and reliable partner that not only reaps the ben-
efits of the EU project but also shares the burdens. In other 
words, the Grants create ‘goodwill’ towards Norway in the 
EU. Second, the Grants create venues for cooperation and 
negotiation, at the bilateral and the EU levels. These can 
serve as arenas where politicians, diplomats and bureau-
crats promote mutual understanding, create networks and 
develop personal relationships valuable in future coopera-
tion. Third, since Norway may influence the priorities in 
the Grants, these venues also offer opportunities for the 
Norwegian government to shape developments in the EU 
and beneficiary states.
All these soft-power resources have the potential to create 
outcomes that may promote Norwegian soft power. They 
can promote awareness of and knowledge about the EEA 
agreement, which is a Norwegian foreign policy aim in it-
self. They also create meeting points (Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) negotiations and annual meetings) and 
can make EU institutions more inclined to listen to Norwe-
gian views and accommodate Norway’s wishes for flexible 
solutions. Further, they can increase the EU’s willingness to 
include Norway in policy areas and cooperation beyond the 
scope of the EEA agreement. Finally, there are opportuni-
ties for disseminating Norwegian priorities and values to 
the EU level, through the beneficiary states and towards the 
EU institutions as such. 
In analysing soft power, it is important to be aware of the 
‘vehicle fallacy’ of mistaking the resource itself for power 
and the ‘exercise fallacy’ of seeing an outcome and automat-
ically presuming it had to be caused by power (Lukes 2005: 
478). This does not mean disregarding power resources or 
observable outcomes – but we should be wary of automati-
cally equating either as manifestations of power. With soft 
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3power, both the soft-power resources and the soft-power 
outcomes should be evident. While not guaranteeing the 
existence of soft power, which is an intangible capacity, this 
makes its existence plausible. This relationship can be il-
lustrated as follows:
Figure 1. The relationship between the Grants and soft 
power
   
        Soft power resources:        Soft power outcomes:
    Goodwill     Awareness
 Grants  Venues for cooperation   Access
    Priorities     Value promotion
TIt is difficult to find hard evidence of the Grants as an ac-
tual source of Norwegian soft power. However, there are in-
dications that Norway has managed to create goodwill in the 
EU and the beneficiary states. For instance, former Prime 
Minister Kubilius of Lithuania has said, ‘everywhere I go in 
the country, I see Norwegian projects, and we are very grate-
ful’ (FMO 2011: 110). Further, according to Norwegian MP 
(Lab.) Laila Gustavsen  (2012), Norway had a strong position 
during the 2012 Cypriot EU Presidency, which might be due 
to the Grants. It is also likely that the Grants have brought 
greater awareness of the EEA agreement among EU offi-
cials and important beneficiary-state stakeholders. For in-
stance, Svein R. Hansen (MP, Lab.) (2012) has claimed that 
the Grants have provided the opportunity for ‘planting Nor-
wegian flags’ in various locations throughout the EU. As a 
result of the Grants, there are negotiation meetings between 
Norway, the EU and the beneficiary states, and the high 
number of partnerships established also means that con-
tacts between Norway and the beneficiary states have in-
creased. Moreover, Norway has managed to shape the direc-
tion of parts of the Grants, so that Norwegian values and 
priorities can affect developments in the beneficiary states. 
For instance, there is earmarked support in the Grants for 
tripartite dialogue, civil society, and carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). Especially environmental support is empha-
sized, with 30 per cent of the EEA Grants and 20 per cent of 
the Norway Grants set aside for this purpose. According to 
Ingrid Schulerud of the NMFA, Norway ‘received 100 per 
cent acceptance for the sectors in which the money is to be 
used’ (Bondevik 2010).
Despite these achievements, we should also note several 
factors that limit the extent to which Norway can derive po-
litical utility from the Grants. 
First, Norway’s contribution is tiny compared to the EU’s 
own internal transfers: the Grants represent only some 0.7 
per cent of EU’s Cohesion Policy. 
Second, even though the EU is grateful for the Norwegian 
contribution, there is still a risk that the generally excellent 
relations between the EU and Norway may be threatened 
by the political frictions created by the recurring negotia-
tions on the Grants. For instance, Norwegian negotiators 
felt that the continuation of the EEA agreement was at stake 
in the negotiations leading up to the 2004–2009 period 
(NMFA 2003). In the negotiations for the 2007–2009 pe-
riod, the EU even froze the EEA agreement and would not 
let new EU legal acts be implemented until agreement on 
the Grants had been reached (Skjævesland and Ask 2007). 
Third, there are also limits to how much of the funding gets 
directed towards Norwegian priorities. For instance, in the 
2009–2014 period, only marginal amounts were earmarked 
for two of Norway’s priority areas (5 per cent to civil society, 
0.5 per cent to tripartite dialogue). 
Fourth, Norwegian politicians seem to ignore many of the 
prospects made possible by the Grants. For instance, the EU 
level is rarely mentioned in Norwegian politicians’ discus-
sions of the Grants. Further, Norwegian attendance at MoU 
signings and Annual Meetings is seldom at the political level. 
Such elements limit the extent to which the Norwegian gov-
ernment can make use of these soft-power resources. 
Norway cannot change the first 
limitation. For structural rea-
sons, the relative size of the 
Grants will always be small. The 
second and the third limitations 
depend on both Norway and the 
other EFTA states and the EU, 
as the direction and institution-
alization of support are negotiated between the two parties. 
The fourth limitation, however, is a purely domestic con-
straint that can be overcome by greater willingness to use 
the Grants strategically, at the EU and the bilateral levels. 
Surmounting this obstacle will also require Norway’s politi-
cians to appreciate the relevance of the EU level. In the end, 
whether or not there will be a change in the Norwegian ap-
proach will depend on the political willingness to use the 
Grants more strategically – a move that might undermine 
Norway’s image of itself as an altruistic small power.
Concluding remarks
The Grants represent a major contribution from Norway to 
large parts of Europe, promoting a peaceful and prosper-
ous continent which is clearly in Norway’s interest. As to 
whether the Grants help Norway to achieve more tangible 
foreign policy goals through ‘soft power’, we have noted sev-
eral ways the Grants can create soft-power resources, serv-
ing as a source of soft-power capacity. 
The financial crisis has dramatic effects on most of the 
economies in the EU, while Norway has remained relative-
ly unscathed. A majority of the EU states are beneficiary 
states, and most of the rest have, for various reasons, no 
reservations against tough demands on Norway (Sletnes 
2009). It should therefore come as no surprise if Norway 
finds itself facing demands for substantially increased con-
tributions in the next negotiation round in 2013/2014. The 
Grants have become de facto a permanent feature. It is on 
the one hand a budgetary constraint on Norway, but it also 
creates a significant political possibility to underpin Norwe-
gian policy towards the EU and its member states. Thus, 
the Norwegian government should be conscious of what it 
wishes and can achieve through the contributions. 
We note that the thematic profile of the Grants have been 
made more consistent with Norwegian policy goals over 
time. But, what can be done to make better use if the soft-
power resources that exist due to the Grants? Below we 
present three policy recommendations:
1) Explore how the Grants could strengthen Norway’s ties with 
the EU, not only with the receiving member states. 
The Norwegian politicians seem to give priority to the bilat-
eral level when considering the political use of the Grants. 
As we have shown, however, there is an unexploited soft-
power potential also at the EU level as a result of the Grants. 
The government should therefore start examining the op-
portunities for EU-level cooperation concerning the Grants. 
As a result of the Grants, Norway already has a national ex-
pert in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO). However, we have 
not found any expressions of official Norwegian intentions 
of making political use of this contact.
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2) Give more priority to the bilateral meetings with the various 
beneficiary states. 
All the beneficiary states are important as agenda-setters in 
the EU, so the contacts between Norway and these countries 
are therefore crucial for influencing developments in the 
EU. Even though these meeting points are important, the 
Norwegian government has not given priority to the venues 
of cooperation that the Grants create (MoU signings and 
annual meetings etc.). Instead of being represented at the 
ministerial level, the Norwegian government has sent an 
ambassador to over half of the MoU signings, which means 
that the Norwegian representative often was of a lower rank 
than the representative from the beneficiary state. In the 
annual meetings, Norway and the beneficiary state meet at 
the level of Division Director General – which weakens the 
political benefit of these encounters. In order to increase 
Norway’s soft-power potential, the Norwegian government 
will need to accord priority to these meetings and be repre-
sented at the political level in these venues.
3) Examine opportunities for formalizing the Grants. 
The recurrent negotiations on the Grants are a source of fric-
tion and uncertainty between Norway and the EU. The EEA 
Agreement, which is considered important for Norwegian 
economy and society, is increasingly dependent upon the suc-
cessful completion of negotiations. The negotiation power is 
increasingly asymmetric with an EU of 500 million and an 
EFTA side of around 5 million. Norwegian politicians have 
several times expressed frustration because of what are seen 
as unjustly high demands from the EU. In the most recent 
round of negotiations, the initial reaction of Dagfinn Høy-
bråten (MP, Chr. Dem.), was that the EU demand was ‘extor-
tion without an objective foundation’ (Aalborg and Vermes 
2008, our translation). The then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Jonas G. Støre (Lab.), termed the EU’s demands ‘indecent 
and exorbitant’ Støre (2009b, our translation) and argued 
that unreasonable EU demands were ‘very damaging for the 
cooperation and the respect’ between Norway and the EU. 
Without objective and institutionalized rules for determin-
ing the  size and content of the Grants, there is no guaran-
tee against unforeseen EU demands creating crises in EU–
Norway relations. The need for reducing uncertainty  was 
also the reasoning behind the proposal for some kind of for-
malization of  the Grants from the majority in the EEA Re-
view Committee (NOU 2012). But Norway’s Standing Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (2012) is unanimous 
in its opposition to such a proposal, arguing especially that 
formalization would make it impossible to phase out the 
support at a future stage (2012: 8). However, historical expe-
riences and the current crisis point in the direction that the 
need to reduce economic and social disparities in Europe is 
unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. 
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